Communitarianism and Individualism in Singapore and Reconciliation

Abstract

Communitarianism is the idea that human identities are largely shaped by different kinds of constitutive communities (or social relations), and that this conception of human nature should inform our moral and political judgments, as well as policies and institutions (Bell, 2001). In Singaporean politics, this idea has been presented as “placing society before self” and has been affirmed in the 1991 White Paper as one of Singapore’s four key Shared Values (Parliament of Singapore, 1991). The White Paper lauds “putting the interests of society as a whole ahead of individual interests” as a “major factor in Singapore’s success”, and contrasts Western communities that stress the rights of the individual with Asian communities that stress the rights of society. There is a tension between the 2 ideas of Singaporean Communitarianism (henceforth referred to as communitarianism) and individualism, since communitarianism involves “putting society before self” (Parliament of Singapore, 1991), whereas individualism encourages putting the self before society. This article aims to outline (1) the development of the attitudes of political leaders with respect to communitarianism; and (2) the tension between individualism and communitarianism in Singapore’s meritocracy and politics.

1. Development of attitudes towards communitarianism

“[Singaporeans have] little doubt that a society with communitarian values where the interests of society takes precedence over that of the individual suits them better than the individualism of America.”

Lee Kuan Yew

Contrary to what Lee Kuan Yew’s outspoken endorsement of communitarianism seems to suggest, the PAP’s position has not always been consistent. As Chua Beng Huat notes, Lee Kuan Yew has previously lauded Singaporeans as “essentially individualistic achievers” due to their immigrant backgrounds, causing them to develop a keen self-centredness, motivating them to work hard in their struggle to survive (Chua, 1997, 26-27). Chua also notes how Dr Goh Keng Swee argued that the extended family system could be an obstacle to economic growth as it discouraged him from working hard, as he would have to share the fruits of his labour with others in the family (Chua, 1997, 27). This argument places great importance on the self and is intensely individualistic. Chua argues that the reason for this is because Lee and Dr Goh prioritised economic growth through capitalism and industrialisation, of which individualism is a core value. This is supported by sociological literature like Durkheim’s analysis of organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1984). Ultimately, Lee and Dr Goh reversed their positions. Chua argues that their reasons for this were that individualism led to an unwillingness to sacrifice self-interest for the social good, and the enshrinement of individual rights could lead to more bargaining for welfarism, which could damage economic competitiveness (Chua, 1997, 27). Chua also notes that individualism was singled out to be dealt with as a form of ideology, even though it was a core value of capitalism. The development of capitalism with the artificial removal of individualism, or what he describes as “wrenching”, has led to some of the tensions we observe below.

Subsequently, the PAP’s position with regards to communitarianism across the different generations of leadership has been mostly consistent. Lee Kuan Yew’s endorsement has been noted. Looking at the second generation of leadership, Goh Chok Tong, in a 1988 speech, called for the White Paper mentioned above, and noted that Singaporeans’ values were shifting from communitarianism to individualism which he deemed a worrying trend. Interestingly, the committee that wrote the White Paper was led by Lee Hsien Loong, who also affirmed his commitment to the self over the individual in his speech presenting the White Paper. More recently, though Lee Hsien Loong has stopped short of explicitly endorsing communitarianism, he has criticised some aspects of westernisation and more specifically “wokeness” (Prime Minister's Office Singapore, 2024). Interpreting this in light of his 1989 speech where Lee explains westernisation’s undesirable effect on individualism, leading to unrestrained materialism and drug culture (Lee, 1989), we can infer that he is at least critical of excessive individualism. On the other hand, Singapore’s fourth prime minister, Lawrence Wong, has not explicitly stated his views on communitarianism when in office as the Prime Minister. However, when he was Minister for Finance, he criticised individualism for leading to isolation, causing people to fall back to “primeval” defences and thus revert to tribal politics. He then went on to note that Singapore’s pledge begins not with the individual but with the collective (Wong, 2021). We can therefore see that, with the exception of an earlier period, the PAP leaders seem to be consistent about the importance of communitarianism or at least disapproving of excessive individualism.

However, it is more important to have a more nuanced understanding of PAP’s position towards communitarianism and individualism. Rather than outright condemning either value, they often exist side-by-side. An example is Section 5 of the Land Acquisition Bill, which stipulates that land can be acquired by the state for any public purpose which, broadly speaking, is in the opinion of the Minister to be of public interest (Tan & Li-ann, 2016, 219). This is a communitarian policy – the interests of an individual should be subordinate to that of the community. However, Singapore concurrently promotes strong individual property rights. A reconciliation can be found in Singapore’s commitment to pragmatism. As Ngiam Tong Dow notes, there is a tacit understanding that the state will only acquire land if it is “clear the purpose is to benefit the majority” (Ngiam, 2007, 12). This utilitarian justification is characteristic of PAP’s core principle of pragmatism – rather than make an ideological commitment, the PAP pragmatically responds to situations at hand (Chua, 1997, 1). Thus, instead of dogmatically condemning either pragmatism or individualism, the foundation of PAP’s ideological stance is pragmatism, which they use to find a balance between the two competing values.

2. Tensions between individualism and communitarianism in Singapore

The tension between these two ideologies is interesting and exists partly because of the “wrenching” that Chua notes, and partly because we sit at the crossroad between the more communitarian east and the more individualistic west. As will be argued, there are areas where these ideologies both conflict and complement each other.

a. Meritocracy

The first tension is in meritocracy. Meritocracy is a core value in Singapore, yet has long been criticised for being individualistic. In his well-known critique of the “tyranny of merit”, communitarian scholar Michael Sandell states that “meritocracy … induces the mistaken impression that we have made it on our own” (Sandel, 2021, 14). To borrow an argument from anarchist scholar Peter Kropotkin (against property), individual appropriation is unjust because many men have worked in their measure to produce what seems like an individual’s fruits of labour (Kropotkin, 2015, 10). Meritocracy is analogous to this – rewarding an individual for what seems like purely his effort but is the combination of his community, the hard work of others, and the circumstances he was fortunate enough to be born into, amongst other factors, is unjust and deludes him into the individualistic view that his rewards are because of his own merit.

More insidiously, Sandel also argues that meritocracy has eroded the dignity of work, undoing social bonds by pitting individuals against each other (Zhuo, 2020). Sandel quotes John Gardner in saying that those who “saw the beauty of a system in which every young person could go as far as his ability and ambition would take him” easily overlooked “the pain involved for those who lacked the necessary ability” (Sandel, 2021, 183). This leaves the underclass morally naked, as Michael Young argues, for it is “hard … in a society that makes so much of merit to be judged as having none.” (Young, 2001). Meritocracy can thus be a splintering force within society and erode social bonds, causing greater individualism. This is exacerbated by how this splintering is associated with moral worth, which, deplorably, means that certain professions have less moral worth than others.

So, if meritocracy has individualistic leanings, can we reconcile this with communitarianism? We can already see this some evidence of splintering along meritocratic lines – a study done showed that Singaporeans had high diversity scores (a proxy for the extent to which Singapore citizens interact with people of those categories) for age and gender diversity, somewhat higher for race, nationality, education and religious diversity, but somewhat lower scores across the dichotomy of those who attended elite schools and those who did not, and those who resided in private housing and those who resided in public housing (Tan et al., 2018).

One view put forth by Dr. Sor Hoon Tan (Tan, 2024) is that Confucianism can provide the resources to combat this. It could be argued that Confucianism, which has certain communitarian leanings, could help with a less individualistic understanding of meritocracy that helps to reconcile the gap between individualism and communitarianism. She argues that Confucians value humility, especially in those that hold high positions. Confucians’ acknowledgement of ming (fate), as well as the countless others who have had an impact on the very person one has become, can counter Sandel’s criticism where an individual assumes he is solely responsible for his rewards. Dr Sor also points out that the Confucian conception that persons cultivate themselves to fulfil their humanity within key relationships implies a sense of personal responsibility that is social, counteracting the splintering effects of meritocracy. However, while Confucianism has been used as a state-mandated ideology for social engineering (Gao et al., 2021) and (Kuah, 1990), this approach should be taken cautiously as it might be viewed as an attempt to subsume the other Sigaporean cultures within a chinese philosophy. Still, this possible reconciliation is surely one worth considering.

b. Politics

I will avoid discussion of heavily criticised areas like ISA and POFMA, due to the already abundant literature available on these topics.

The next tension is to do with the individualism of consultative governance and the conformism found in communitarian societies. Since the 1980s, the PAP has increasingly embraced the values of openness, consultation and participation (Tan & Tan, 2003, 18). Yet, according to a study by the IPS, the majority of Singaporean respondents perceive the government as non-consultative, and also believe that Singaporeans benefit from following the rules and obeying authority (Matthews et al., 2021, 81). An attempt will be made to reconcile these two perspectives, to answer the question of why Singaporeans feel like the government is not consultative although concerted efforts have been made. While government policies such as “Forward Singapore” have been criticised as not meeting the standard of a genuine democratic deliberation (Tan, 2024, 44), and this might be part of the reason for the perceived lack of consultative governance, the aim of this discussion is not to discuss the effectiveness government policies, but rather to point out tensions and reconciliation on a broader ideological basis.

Consultative governance is individualistic. It is a two-way street that requires both participation from the people and acceptance from the government. Yet, participation from the people requires some form of individualism. As Bellah notes, Lockean individualism states that the individual is prior to society, which comes into existence through the social contract. This individual, being prior to society, participates in consultative governance or civil society when it is useful to him. However, he only knows this when consulting his own desires and sentiments, which is ultimately the source of the expressive individualist tradition (Bellah, 1996, 169). We can see that government participation requires individualism of some form that communitarian societies might struggle to provide.

Furthermore, Singapore’s communitarianism is conformist. As quoted above, most Singaporeans believe they benefit from following rules and obeying authority (Matthews et al., 2021, 81). A reason for this is that along the conformist-pluralist dimensions, Singapore’s communitarianism is more conformist. As Driver and Martell argue, conformist communitarianism involves commonly held norms, values and practices that individuals are expected to go along with, and are viewed as having duties to the community. There is a focus on building commonality and there is a pressure for individuals to conform (Driver & Martell, 1997, 30). Singapore falls under this description, with the White Paper on shared values serving as an example, Another example is Lee Hsien Loong’s swearing-in speech, where he noted that “we will look after the less educated and elderly who have helped build Singapore”, indicating a duty towards society that places Singapore on the conformist side of the conformist-pluralist dimension. This fits Driver and Martell’s mode of conformist communitarianism, explaining why Singaporeans prefer to follow rules and obey authority (Matthews et al., 2021, 81).

In seeking to reconcile participation in governance with communitarianism, an analogy will be drawn between participation in governance and civil societies, so as to rely on the more extensive literature concerning civil society. Ralph Dahrendorf defines civil society as being “characterised in general by the existence of autonomous (i.e not supervised by state or any structure) organisations and institutions as organs of people’s will” (Lucka, 2002, 379). Simplistically, civil society and participation in government are similar in that they involve individuals championing what they want, but are different in the way they achieve it – civil society is independent of the government, while consultative governance is not.

First, consultative governance based on individualism is undesirable. Gawkowska argues that individualism treats civil society as merely instrumental, as individuals only champion their own interests rather than those of the common good. Lucka argues that, consequently, there is a lack of attachment to the concept of the common good and common goals, and quotes Gawkowska that this results in a vicious cycle where “it is difficult to mobilise [the people] for common purposes and the consequent lack of effective common action makes them feel powerless” (Lucka, 2002, 388). This powerlessness then leads back to the first part of the cycle, making it more “difficult to mobilise [the people] for common purposes.” This is particularly relevant in explaining the lack of participation in consultative governance in Singapore, since a conformist attitude corresponds to a difficulty in mobilising people. This leads to perceiving the government as non-consultative and feeling powerless, which then leads back to difficulties in mobilising people. However, a key distinction should still be made in the Singapore context. It is doubtful whether this exact causative chain can be made out in Singapore, since, as Rajah argues, the government attempted to use public discourse to dismantle rights vital to civil society – by interfering with the right of non-state actors to (1) organise, (2) enter the public domain, and (3) engage the state in a relationship of parity (Rajah, 2012, 163). Casualties included vital sections of civil society, such as trade unions (Rajah, 2012, 82), and the Law Society of Singapore (Rajah, 2012, 166). Thus, government intervention seemed to start this vicious cycle, though ultimately what happened afterwards seems to follow Gawkowska’s model.

In reconciling communitarianism and a civil society, Lucka argues that the remedy is a communitarian approach towards civil society, and that communitarian features like strong communities and shared values might have a positive impact on the development of civil society. He also argues that contrary to, and arguably more desirable than the individualist conception, participation in civil society can involve championing not only for his own interests but that of society’s too if the individual is understood as one who is rooted in the tradition of his groups and has some responsibilities towards them (Lucka, 2002, 388). Lucka points out that this enriched communitarian conception of civil society is termed by Wesolowski as a “socialisation of the classical view of civil society” (Lucka, 2002, 389), the classical view being based on individual freedom amongst other values. Lucka also notes Etzioni’s argument that the prerequisite of a strong civil society is a strong feeling of belonging and common values based on a shared definition of the common good (Lucka, 2002, 389). When applying these observations to reconcile government participation with communitarianism, it seems there are two main takeaways – the first is a shift away from an individualistic conception of interest towards a more communitarian one that strives towards the benefit of the groups, which is in line with the Singapore government’s communitarian rhetoric that places community above the self, and second is developing a strong foundation of common values and shared definition of the common good, which the government has been striving towards, like how the theme of SG60 is “Building Our Singapore Together”, allowing citizens to “reflect on shared values such as multiculturalism, boldness, resilience and openness” (Goh, 2024). Ultimately, these are ways a more consultative form of governance can be achieved by reconciling communitarianism and government participation, though this is much easier said than done. It is also questionable to what extent values can be changed by something top-down like government policies.

Conclusion

To quote Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong,

“Singapore did not believe in the Western liberal democratic model which developed in the last half-century as the pinnacle of human achievement and the solution for the whole of the world.”

Singapore’s position is always interesting in that more often than not, conflicting ideologies from the east vs west, like neoliberalism and socialism and, as argued, individualism and communitarianism, pull society in different directions. Singapore poses an enduring challenge to the orthodox conceptions of liberal democracies characteristic of writers like Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” – the “universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1989, 4). Ultimately, governing Singapore is endlessly complex and, with the succession of a new Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, only time will tell how new challenges like increasing inequality, an ageing population, and innovating on “Singaporean exceptionalism” will turn out.